T HE United States went into the
Middle East after the Second World War for two main reasons, oil and the containment of the Soviet Union. The first, oil, was originally a commercial interest, but with the onset of the cold war it also took its place in a general political-military strategy. American policy, from as early as 1945, was aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from expanding its power into the Middle East. That meant helping Greece to win its civil war, backing Turkey against Soviet pressure to subvert its independence, pressing for Soviet evacuation of northern Iran, buttressing or replacing a declining Britain in many of its historic positions, and trying to gain the co-operation of Arabs and Jews as well as of Turks and Iranians in "denying" the Middle East to the Soviets. This was, in American eyes, a defensive policy. The Middle East was part of the free world. Its peoples deserved protection and support against aggression or subversion. Moreover, they occupied what President Eisenhower called the most important strategic territory in the world, Soviet control of which would threaten the world balance of power and the security of the West. Two big reasons for the importance of territory, from the standpoint of American strategy, were that it provided strategic bomber bases-considered vital in those early years-for the global nuclear deterrent and that it contained the world's greatest resources in oil essential to the West in peace or in war. In strategic weapons it set out to close the gap, so that it would have at least effective parity with the United States. In conventional arms and general purpose forces it undertook an expansion, largely in naval forces, so as to develop a capacity to exert military power on all the seas and all the continents. In other words, the Soviets decided to cast off the limitations of being only a continental land power and a global nuclear power. Experience had taught them that they needed something more: flexible power which could be brought to bear at points on the globe far removed from the homeland. Khrushchev had adopted a policy of competition with the West throughout the Third World, but he had been unsuccessful because he did not have the military capabilities to support it.
For such a strategy the placement of naval units in the Mediterranean was a necessary first step, because the inland sea was a corridor to the Atlantic through Gibraltar and to the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal-whenever it might be opened. The visits of Soviet naval vessels to the Indian Ocean, which began in 1968, and the holding of maneuvers spread over several oceans at once, to say nothing of bombastic speeches of Soviet admirals, were indications of the global character of Soviet naval planning, construction, and strategy. To return to the local scene, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, and on a smaller scale in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean, has had the specific purpose of buttressing Soviet freedom of action and limiting that of the United States. For years the Sixth Fleet had been useful in a kind of aircraft-carrier diplomacy: in critical situations it had been moved to this point or that to serve as a warning to one government or as a sign of encouragement to another. The landing in Lebanon in 1958 was quick and easy because the Sixth Fleet was right there. The presence of the Soviet squadron means that the Mediterranean is no longer an American lake. Thus it might itself engage in the same kind of diplomacy through the demonstration of power, or it might by its existence or interposition make such action impossible for the Sixth Fleet.
Whether the United States could or would again do what it did in 1958 is questionable, and perhaps the presence of the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean would not be the main factor in such a decision. The use of the Sixth Fleet as part of the political strategy aimed at discouraging Syria from moving armed forces into Jordan in September 1970, however, indicated that Washington did not feel unduly hampered.
The real value to the Soviets of their naval force, in any event, lay in its continuing political influence. It gave comfort to friends and created doubts and fears among others. It was physical evidence of the Soviet Union's status as a Mediterranean and Middle East power, one which had to be reckoned with in any major international decisions in that area.
THE POLITICAL STRATEGY
No simple explanation-whether one searches for it in geography or in Peter the Great's will or in the doctrine of Lenin-will provide the key to the aims and the conduct of Soviet policy in the Middle East. As a great power, Russia in its tsarist and soviet forms has had strategic interests to advance and to protect in its competition with rival powers. On the defensive side, it has striven to maintain control of the Black Sea; to have the doors to its house, the Turkish Straits, in safe hands, preferably its own; and to prevent the countries on its southern borders from being used by other powers to threaten Russian security. On the offensive side, the Russian Empire had a history of southward expansion that included domination and annexation of non-Russian peoples. The Soviet Union, in its quest for friendly governments co-operating closely with the socialist states, has tried to establish with such governments positions of preponderant influence approaching control on all matters of importance to Soviet interests.
Since the Second World War, Soviet policy in the Middle East cannot be considered other than in relation to the global balance and competition with the United States. Thus, its push into the Middle East has taken place in a period when that region was a Western, increasingly an American, sphere of influence. 
ARAB NATIONALISM AND SOVIET POLICY
Soviet policy and Arab nationalism began to discover each other when it became apparent that they had some common enemies. Khrushchev showed the Arabs that the Soviet Union could be an alternative to the West, as a source of arms and other aid, a balancing factor against Western domination, and an ally against Israel. Abdel Nasser was delighted, when the opportunity came, to bring Soviet influence into the Middle East. He did so for Egyptian and Arab purposes as did the leaders of Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and other Arab states. But the Soviets were extending their influence for their own purposes. It was a working relationship from which both sides profited, but neither had full faith and trust in the other.
The Soviet Union made Egypt the center of its Middle Eastern strategy. At the land bridge between Asia and Africa and in control of the water link from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, its location had made it a key strategic area throughout history. The most populous of the Arab states, it had a political and cultural primacy which Nasser had asserted vigorously. A strong position in Egypt and a close tie with Nasser would obviously serve Soviet interests well. Syria also was the subject of the Kremlin's special attention, for though it lacked strength, it had a strong tradition of Arab nationalism going beyond its borders, and its radical politics opened it up to communist influence. The Soviet leaders swallowed the merger of Syria with Egypt in 1958, although they did not like it; and after Syria broke away again and later fell under Ba'th party leadership, they were back again displaying a considerable interest in Syrian politics and an extraordinary sensitivity concerning its international position.
After the happy combination of Soviet diplomacy and Arab nationalism produced a series of political victories in the 1950s, relations between Nasser and Khrushchev struck some sour phases at the end of the decade because of the activities of communists-Nasser called them "agents of a foreign power"-in the new United Arab Republic. Yet both sides were wise enough to limit the dispute to random insults. The marriage of convenience was worth preserv- On several occasions, while the U.N. Representative, Gunnar Jarring, has been pursuing his mission of working for an agreement between the parties and while the subject has been up for discussion among the four powers-the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France-or directly between the two-the USSR and the United States-Soviet spokesmen have specifically said yes, they do want a political settlement. The Soviet search for a more solid institutional basis for durable ties and lasting influence goes on. The alliances with radical Arab leaders seeking help in their campaigns against the West and against Israel have paid dividends, but they grew out of circumstance and can be changed by it; even the fifteen-year treaty with Egypt, an attempt to give continuity to the relationship, was the product of a special and perhaps transitory situation. Elaborate Soviet theories about the historic role of progressive elements or national democratic states in the Middle East taking the noncapitalist path have proved more useful as ideological justification for Soviet foreign policy than as an accepted basis for common action. The socialism of Egyptians, Syrians, or Algerians bears little resemblance to the "scientific" variety practiced in the Soviet Union. The mass organizations organized in Arab states have never served either those regimes or the Soviets in the manner of a proper, Soviet-style, ruling party.
As for the local communist parties, they have proved to be weak reeds. Their participation in politics has been on the sufferance of nationalist leaders, and when they have come near to seizing power, as they did in Iraq or Sudan, they have been chopped down. As new nationalist leaders have appeared on the scene-Qadhdhafi, Boumedienne, Numayri, or even Sadat-the Islamic strain appears stronger than the socialist, and the distrust of Russia as an imperialist power may begin to match that felt for the United States.
The very uncertainty about Soviet policies increases the difficulty for the United States in determining its own. The detente in Soviet-American relations marked by the strategic arms limitation talks and by the Berlin agreement has not spread to the Middle East. In that region, moreover, no such clear line of division between blocs exists as in Europe: while some countries are formally aligned with one side or another, most of them are not, with resulting uncertainty or danger. American fatigue over foreign responsibilities and reconsideration of commitments may lead the Soviet Union or Middle Eastern governments to question this country's resolution or staying power. The situation contains elements of surprise and of overnight crisis, partly because the two outside powers are not sure how far their own and each other's vital interests and commitments go, partly because they do not exercise control of local forces and conflicts which can draw them into confrontation. But crisis diplomacy will be no substitute for long-term steadiness of purpose and flexibility of means. The Soviet Union is in the Middle East to stay. The real question is how to make sure that its presence takes forms that are tolerable to the security of others.
